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Persuasion is an important element of human communication. But in many situations,
we resist rather than embrace persuasive attempts. Resistance to persuasion has been
studied in many different disciplines, including communication science, psychology,
and marketing. The present paper reviews and connects these diverse literatures, and
provides an organizing framework for understanding and studying resistance. Four
clusters of resistance strategies are defined (avoidance, contesting, biased processing,
and empowerment), and these clusters are related to different motivations for resisting
persuasion (threat to freedom, reluctance to change, and concerns of deception). We
propose that, while avoidance strategies may be triggered by any of these motivations,
contesting strategies are linked primarily to concerns of deception, while empowerment
and biased processing strategies are most common when people are reluctant to
change.
Keywords: persuasion, resistance, reactance, deception, change
Introduction
Persuasion plays a prominent role in daily life. People frequently try to convince others to change
their attitudes, opinions, or behavior. Consider a manager asking one of his employees to work
extra hours during the weekend, a politician convincing the public to give him their vote, a doctor
encouraging his patients to take their medicines, or a television commercial persuading consumers
that they need a safe car to take good care of their beloved families. However, achieving such change
is not as easy as it may seem. As Miller (1965) explains, “In our daily lives we are struck not by the
ease of producing attitude change but by the rarity of it” (p. 121).
Attempts at persuasion often have limited impact. One of the most important reasons might
be that people do not want to be influenced; they are motivated to resist persuasion (Ringold,
2002). Motivated resistance does not underlie all instances of attenuation of attitudinal or behavioral
change. Persuasion attempts may be poorly designed or executed, or their impact may be reduced
by interfering influences from other sources. Following Knowles and Linn (2004, p. 3), we therefore
differentiate between motivated resistance and outcome resistance, which is simply defined as “the
antithesis of persuasion” or the lack of attitude change in response to a persuasion attempt (cf.,
Sagarin et al., 2002). Motivated resistance acknowledges that people are armed with resistance
strategies that may impede even well designed campaigns. More formally, it entails a state in
which people aim to reduce attitudinal or behavioral change and maintain their current attitude.
In doing so, people oppose, counter, and resist persuasive attempts by adopting strategies such
as counter arguing or avoidance. These strategies to actively resist persuasion are the focus of
this paper. Our conceptualization of resistance echoes McGuire (1964), who regarded resistance
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to persuasion as a property of a person that could be enhanced by
message or context factors.
Resistance to persuasion has been studied in many research
domains, such as social psychology, marketing, health, and
political communication. These domains are intrinsically linked
to each other but also showmany different approaches to the topic
of resistance toward persuasion. Due to this rather disconnected
nature of previous work on resistance toward persuasion, we
emphasize that we do not claim to provide an exhaustive review of
the literature. However, we do propose a preliminary framework
that organizes available resistance strategies and motivational
factors that explain why people resist and when particular
resistance strategies are adopted. The purpose of this article is
therefore twofold. First, we review and make a first attempt
to synthesize existing literature on resistance. This offers an
overview of the strategies that people use to resist unwanted
persuasion. Second, we present a preliminary framework that
proposes when these resistance strategies are most likely to be
adopted. This framework (a) offers a guideline for communication
practitioners who aim to persuade people toward, for example,
healthier behavior and (b) facilitates the development of resistance
programs designed to help vulnerable people resist unwanted
persuasion.
This article is structured as follows. First, we present an
overview of resistance strategies, explaining how people resist
persuasion. In doing so, we organize the existing literature into
four main types of strategies that people might adopt when
exerting resistance: avoidance strategies, contesting strategies,
biased processing strategies, and empowerment strategies. Next,
we argue that the type of resistance strategy people adopt depends
on the motives they have for resisting the message, namely,
threat to freedom, reluctance to change, and concerns about
deception. These three motives for people to resist persuasion
are introduced and discussed separately in conjunction with
message and personality factors that are likely to affect them.
Finally, we present a preliminary framework in which the use
of the different resistance strategies is predicted by the different
resistance motives. This results in a set of propositions describing
the relationships between resistance strategies and underlying
motives.
How People Resist Persuasion
This section reviews the different strategies that individuals
apply to resist persuasion. We group the strategies into four
clusters. The first cluster consists of avoidance strategies. These
are the most passive strategies, and involve the mere avoidance
of persuasion attempts. The second cluster consists of contesting
strategies. This includes the active challenging of the message,
the source, or persuasion tactics used. The third cluster consists
of biased processing strategies, which involves strategies by which
recipients selectively process or understand the message in such
way that it favors their original attitudes or behavior. The
fourth cluster, empowerment strategies, consists of strategies where
individuals assert their own, existing views instead of challenging
the persuasive communication. Below, we define and discuss these
strategies.
Avoidance Strategies
Avoidance is perhaps the most straightforward means of
protecting oneself from the impact of persuasive messages.
Avoidance behavior has primarily been studied in the context
of marketing communications, where researchers have studied
the factors that cause individuals to switch channels (zapping),
fast forward commercials in recorded programs (zipping), switch
off their television, or leave the room to avoid commercial
messages (Brodin, 2007). For example, Woltman et al. (2003)
demonstrate in their research that television viewers more often
avoid informational messages as opposed to emotional and
entertaining messages. Avoidance is not limited to television
advertising. Speck and Elliott (1997) discuss avoidance behaviors
in several media, including print and radio advertising. They
distinguish between physical avoidance, whereby people leave the
room or avoid the advertising section in a newspaper;mechanical
avoidance like zapping and zipping; and cognitive avoidance, i.e.,
“ignoring” or “not paying attention to” commercial messages.
Dreze and Hussherr (2003, p. 8) describe avoidance of online
media. Studying audience eye movements, these authors found
that “surfers actually avoid looking at banner ads during their
online activities,” also referred to as banner-blindness (Resnick
and Albert, 2014). Finally, Kirmani and Campbell (2004) have
described physical avoidance in an interpersonal context, and
found evidence for a so-called “forestall strategy,” in which
shoppers physically avoid salespersons, for example by crossing
the street or avoiding sections where a sales representative walks
around.
Researchers in political and health communication have also
studied avoidance, in the form of “selective exposure” or “selective
avoidance.” This is the tendency to avoid media programming
or titles likely to contain messages contradicting one’s own
beliefs (e.g., Freedman and Sears, 1965; Knobloch-Westerwick
and Meng, 2009). Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory
regards this behavior as a strategy for decreasing the dissonance
that people experience due to inconsistencies. This experienced
dissonance can be reduced by avoiding inconsistent information
or searching for new consistent information. For example,
Brock and Balloun (1967) showed that people who smoke
paid more attention to a message stating that smoking is not
detrimental to their health than to a message stating that
smoking is a serious health risk. The opposite pattern was
found for people who do not smoke. The link between cognitive
dissonance and selective exposure has been examined in many
studies. Meta-analyses of this work (e.g., Freedman and Sears,
1965; Frey, 1986; D’Alessio and Allen, 2007; Hart et al., 2009)
emphasize the importance of considering moderating variables
for this effect. One of the most important moderaters is attitude
strength or extremity. Consistent with the notion of cognitive
dissonance, selective exposure behavior seems more likely for
individuals with a stronger opinion. For example, Brannon et al.
(2007) demonstrated that participants preferred reading articles
with titles that were consistent with their own attitudes, and
this tendency increased with the extremity of their attitudes.
Knobloch-Westerwick andMeng (2009) obtained similar findings
when tracking reading behavior in an online environment. In
addition to attitude strength, a wide range of message and
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audience characteristics moderate the selective exposure effect
(Smith et al., 2008).
Contesting Strategies
Instead of avoiding the message, individuals may actively contest
(a) the content of the message, (b) the source of the message, or
(c) the persuasive strategies used in themessage. Belowwe discuss
these three forms of contestation.
Contesting the Content
A frequently used resistance strategy is to counter argue the
message (e.g., Wright, 1975; Zuwerink Jacks and Cameron,
2003). We refer to this behavior as “contesting the content”
to emphasize that this strategy is closely related to source
derogation (contesting the source of a message) and to defensive
responses studied in consumer research (contesting the persuasive
strategy). Contesting the content of a message is a thought process
that decreases agreement with a counter attitudinal message.
It is often conceptualized as a mediating variable between a
persuasive message and outcomes such as attitudes and behavior
(Festinger and Maccoby, 1964; Silvia, 2006). When contesting
the content of a message, people reflect on the arguments in
the message and subsequently use counterarguments to refute it.
Counterarguments are activated when incoming information is
compared to existing beliefs and discrepancies are noted (Wright,
1973). Counter arguing can be encouraged by forewarning
(Wood and Quinn, 2003), i.e., the (upfront) disclosure of the
persuasive intent and/or content of a message. The effectiveness
of forewarning increases when a greater time delay occurs
between the warning and the message, because this gives them
the opportunity to generate counterarguments (e.g., Chen et al.,
1992). Consistent with this finding, recent research demonstrated
that counter arguing is less likely for narratives because the
persuasive intentions are less clear for such communications.
However, counter arguing may be triggered when the narrative
is combined with elements revealing the persuasive intent of the
message (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi, 2011; Niederdeppe et al., 2012).
Contesting the Source
In addition to contesting content, individuals may contest the
source of a message. This behavior has been referred to as
source derogation, and involves dismissing the credibility of
sources or questioning their expertise or trustworthiness (Abelson
and Miller, 1967; Zuwerink Jacks and Cameron, 2003). In
earlier research on persuasion, source derogation was perceived
as a communication strategy that could be used to reduce
or counter the effect of persuasion attempts (e.g., Anderson,
1967). In later research, Wright (1973, 1975) demonstrated
that source derogation may be used as a cognitive response
to persuasion attempts. Wright regards source derogation as
a low-effort alternative to counter arguing because it requires
processing of one single cue—the source of the message. Source
derogation also underlies the observation that information
from commercial sources (e.g., advertising) is viewed as less
trustworthy than information from non-commercial sources
(e.g., other consumers—Batinic and Appel, 2013). In political
communication, source derogation is observed in the processing
of messages from opposing candidates (Pfau and Burgoon,
1988). Related to source derogation is the idea of defensive
stereotyping. Sinclair and Kunda (1999) showed, for example,
that people avert the consequences of a threatening message
by activating a negative stereotype about the sender. This
way the credibility of both the sender and the message
reduces.
Contesting the Strategies Used
Persuasive messages can also be resisted by focusing on the
persuasive strategies used. The Persuasion Knowledge Model
(Friestad andWright, 1994) proposes that people develop theories
and beliefs about how persuasion agents try to influence them.
For example, many people know that advertisers use babies,
puppies, or beautiful models to appeal to emotions. Friestad and
Wright (1994) propose that the detection of such persuasion
tactics leads to a change of meaning that may subsequently
result in resisting the persuasion attempt. Darke and Ritchie
(2007) argued that people may even generalize these negative
responses from one instance to the other, thereby providing
a possible foundation for defensive stereotyping responses
(e.g., “all advertising is untruthful”). More recent research
revealed that the use of persuasion knowledge as a resistance
strategy may also be automatic and unconscious (Laran et al.,
2011).
Persuasion knowledge has been found to develop over time,
with age and exposure tomarketingmessages (Wright et al., 2005),
although several studies have indicated that even young children
possess elementary knowledge of the persuasive tactics used by
marketers, which may be accompanied by a corrective (negative)
response to persuasion attempts (Buijzen et al., 2010).
Biased Processing Strategies
To resist persuasive messages people can also engage in biased
processing such that a message fits their attitudes and behavior
or reduces relevance. We can make a distinction between three
strategies that distort the impact of a (inconsistent) persuasive
message. The first two strategies,weighting attributes and reducing
impact involve the distortion of information that is inconsistent
with a particular attitude or behavior. The final strategy, optimism
bias, is related to dismissing the relevance of a message.
Weighting Attributes
Ahluwalia (2000) showed that people may engage in biased
message processing to resist persuasion such that more weight
is attached to information that is consistent with one’s attitudes
and less weight is attached to inconsistent information. Ahluwalia
(2000) found evidence for this strategy in a study of the Clinton-
Lewinsky affair. She found that people who were strongly
committed to Clinton shifted the importance that they attached
to individual traits of politicians. When pro-Clinton voters heard
about the affair, they responded by attaching less weight to
traits such as honesty and morality, which were jeopardized by
the affair, and more weight to unrelated traits like intelligence
and strong leadership. This effect was particularly strong when
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the information about the affair itself became more difficult to
refute.
Reducing Impact
The impact of information that is inconsistent with one’s current
attitudes can also be distorted by actively avoiding a “spillover” or
“halo” effect, and isolating judgments of the “focal” attribute from
one’s other judgments. Ahluwalia (2000) found that people who
are motivated to resist negative information do not display spill-
over or halo-effects in their responses to negative information
about one particular aspect of an object. This allowed them to
minimize the impact of the negative information on their overall
evaluation of the object. Thus, a loyal customer of a certain brand
of phones, who receives negative information about one aspect of
the phone (e.g., signal reception) will only adjust their opinion
of this single aspect. For less loyal customers, such information
will lead to a spillover or halo effect, so that opinions about
other aspects of the phone (e.g., design or durability) will also be
affected.
Optimism Bias
Another strategy to distort the impact of inconsistent information
is optimism bias. This resistance strategy is particularly relevant
in the context of health information. It is suggested that message
recipients have the tendency to believe that negative things are
less likely to happen to them than to others (Weinstein, 1987;
Sharot et al., 2011; Shepperd et al., 2013). As a result they tend
to downplay the risks or exaggerate the perception of their own
ability to control the situation (Chambers and Windschitl, 2004).
When a message makes, for example, smokers aware of the
detrimental effect of this unhealthy behavior they construe all
kinds of reasons why these threats do not apply to them personally
and why they are less at risk than others. They might, for example,
respond with “While smoking may cause lung cancer, I do not
think this risk is very high for me because it does not run in my
family.”
Empowerment Strategies
Empowerment strategies involve empowering or strengthening
the self or one’s existing attitudes to reduce one’s vulnerability
to external influence attempts. When using these strategies,
people search to confirm their confidence in existing beliefs or
themselves. Within this category three different strategies can
be distinguished. The first two, attitude bolstering and social
validation, aim to reinforce a particular existing attitude. The
third empowerment strategy, self-assertion, aims to increase one’s
general self-confidence. This strategy strengthens self-confidence,
and not one particular attitude.
Attitude Bolstering
Attitude bolstering is a process by which people generate
thoughts that are supportive of their existing attitudes (e.g.,
Abelson, 1959; Lydon et al., 1988). Upon exposure to messages,
recipients reconsider the reasons for their current attitudes and
behavior. They do not refute or challenge the arguments that
are presented in the message For example, a person in favor of
the right to abortion can resist a pro-life message by actively
thinking about arguments that support the right to abortion
rather than countering the arguments in the pro-life message.
Recently, Xu and Wyer (2012) demonstrated that it is possible to
induce a “bolstering mindset” and that the process of generating
affirmative thoughts about one subject may trigger attitude
bolstering about other topics.
Social Validation
To strengthen their current attitude, people can also seek
validation from significant others. Zuwerink Jacks and Cameron
(2003) found that people who are presented with a persuasive
message that is incongruent with their existing attitude think
of others who share their existing beliefs. This confirms their
current attitude or behavior and makes them less susceptible
to persuasion. Axsom et al. (1987) found that people use
responses of their audience as a heuristic cue for the accuracy
of their own ideas. In their study, participants were presented
with manipulated positive or negative audience feedback to
a message. The results indicated that enthusiastic (positive)
feedback enhanced the impact of the message.
Self Assertions
In their research on resistance strategies, Zuwerink Jacks and
Cameron (2003) observed that people may resist persuasion
by asserting the self. People who apply this strategy remind
themselves that nothing can change their attitudes or behavior
because they are confident about them. This phenomenon occurs
for two reasons. First, peoplewith high self-esteem are particularly
confident about their own opinions and thus less likely to change
their attitudes and behavior upon exposure to a persuasive
message. Second, sociometer theory (Leary and Baumeister,
2000) argues that persuasion typically occurs because people
desire to behave appropriately and therefore avoid disapproval by
conforming to the message. People with high self-esteem feel less
social pressure to conform because they feel valued and accepted,
which reduces their motivation to behave in a socially appropriate
manner (Moreland and Levine, 1989).
Why People Experience Resistance Toward
Persuasion
The previous section reviewed strategies that people use to resist a
persuasive message. We propose that the type of strategy adopted
depends on each person’s specificmotive for resisting themessage.
In this section, we discuss three motives for resistance: threats
to freedom, reluctance to change, and concern about deception.
These motives derive from various research domains and will be
applied to the field of persuasive communication to elucidate why
people aremotivated to resist a persuasive attempt. In addition, we
discuss factors related to the activation of each resistance motive.
Threats to Freedom
The theory of psychological reactance is one of the best-known
frameworks for understanding why people resist persuasion (for
reviews, see Burgoon et al., 2002; Rains, 2013). Reactance theory
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assumes that human beings have an innate desire for autonomy
and independence and experience psychological reactance when
they sense that their freedom is threatened or eliminated. When
people feel that their freedom is threatened, they are motivated
to maintain and restore the threatened opinion or behavior
(Brehm and Brehm, 1981). Hence, reactance is regarded as the
motivational state of a person whose freedom is threatened.
In the context of persuasion, people can feel threatened in
their freedom to (a) exhibit particular attitudes and behavior, (b)
change their attitudes and behavior, and (c) avoid committing to
any position or behavior (Worchel and Brehm, 1970; Brehm and
Brehm, 1981). Even when a message is not contrary to existing
beliefs or behavior or when the message is in the receiver’s best
interest, persuasive attempts are often perceived as an external
threat to freedom. This perception of threat could eventually
result in so-called “boomerang-effects” in which people distance
themselves from the advocated message and are motivated to
engage in less (more) of the encouraged (discouraged) behavior.
This phenomenon explains why persuasive attempts not only may
be ineffective but also may lead to the opposite of the desired
results, such as an increase in unhealthy behavior or a decrease
in sales (Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Ringold, 2002).
Dillard and Shen (2005) proposed defining reactance at
the level of observable affective and cognitive responses.
Their research suggests that reactance is best described by an
intertwined model in which an affective anger response and a
cognitive response of counter arguing are intertwined. This view
was confirmed in subsequent experimental studies, as revealed
by a recent meta-analysis of 20 different reactance studies (Rains,
2013).
Factors Affecting Threats to Freedom
Although psychological reactance was initially perceived as
situation specific, Brehm and Brehm (1981) recognized that
people vary in the extent to which they experience reactance.
Quick et al. (2011, p. 663) describe trait reactant individuals as
“: : :likely to experience state reactance due to their strong need
for independence and autonomy, confrontational and rebellious
behavior, and a tendency to resist authority in general.” Trait
reactance is commonly measured with the Hong Psychological
Reactance Scale (Hong and Faedda, 1996), which contains items
such as “regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me” and
“I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and
independent decisions.” People with high psychological reactance
will more often be motivated by a threat to freedom than people
who score low on this scale.
Several studies revealed that younger people exhibit more
reactance than older people (Hong et al., 1994). Older people
regard fewer situations as threatening their freedom because they
have learned how to cope with the related emotions. In addition,
Brehm and Brehm (1981) argued that older people are better at
valuing the importance of freedom and are more motivated to
exert a freedom than younger people.
In addition to trait reactance and age, several message factors
have been found to affect the experience of threat to freedom. In
general, threats to freedom are likely to be triggered by any or all
message factors that seem to impose a certain behavior or opinion
upon the audience. Research on language use suggests that the
use of intense, forceful or dogmatic language, and particularly that
which threatens choice, in a persuasivemessage triggers perceived
threats to freedom that may subsequently result in boomerang
effects (Worchel and Brehm, 1970; Buller et al., 2000; Dillard and
Shen, 2005). Examples of language that threatens choice include
phrases such as “No other conclusion makes any sense” and
“There is a problem, and you have to be part of the solution”
(Dillard and Shen, 2005; see also Quick and Stephenson, 2007).
Kronrod et al. (2012) have used the term “assertive language” to
refer to messages that use the imperative form or other wording
that leaves no option for refusal (i.e., “youmust: : :”). In their study
of messages about environmental issues, these authors found
that such language may reduce compliance from individuals who
attach little importance to the topic (see also Baek et al., 2015).
Moreover, guilt appeals have also been found to induce feelings
of anger, which is an essential element of reactance. For example,
Englis (1990) found that people who were exposed to a guilt
commercial reported lower levels of happiness and higher levels
of anger, scorn, and disgust.
Threats to freedom may be prevented by elements of
communication that emphasize freedom of choice. In terms of
language use, this effect may be achieved by using politeness
strategies, such as indirect requests, or by providing suggestions,
examples, or hints rather than direct requests (Brown, 1987).
Beyond language factors, Shen (2010) has demonstrated that
empathy-inducing messages (i.e., using language or visual
elements that foster perspective-taking and emotional responses)
reduce the extent to which an audience experiences threats
to freedom. More broadly, Moyer-Gusé (2008) proposed that
entertainment persuasion, which uses narrative communication
and induces identification with the main character decreases
the extent to which people experience threats to freedom.
Interestingly, a recent study by Moyer-Gusé et al. (2012) indicates
that these effects may be undone if an explicit appeal is “tagged
on” to the narrative message.
Reluctance to Change
Changing people’s attitudes and behavior is often a difficult
process because people are naturally motivated to retain their
existing beliefs and behavior. Change involves going from the
known to the unknown (Steinburg, 1992) and implies a loss of
control over one’s situation, which has been identified as a primary
cause for resistance (Conner, 1992). A reluctance to change may
be caused by an unwillingness to change, but also by a desire to
stay the same. While these two forms seem similar at first sight,
the former is related closely to a general idea of rigidity, while the
latter is more specific, and may occur primarily for beliefs that are
important, and perhaps even central to one’s self.Wewill elaborate
upon this distinction in our discussion of the factors that drive
reluctance to change.
A persuasive attempt may also induce consistency concerns
(Petty et al., 2004), i.e., a fear that changing a behavior or opinion
will lead to inconsistencies with prior beliefs or behaviors. People
are unwilling toward the possibility that persuasive information
may challenge an important belief. This may go beyond the
general notion of avoiding cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).
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Reasons that may make people reluctant toward change include
(a) the desire to not lose something of value, (b) believing that the
proposed change does not make sense, (c) perceiving greater risks
than benefits, and (d) being satisfied with the current situation
(Hultman, 1995; Kotter and Schlesinger, 2008).
Factors Affecting Reluctance to Change
Several psychological factors are correlated with individuals’
generalized reluctance to change their attitudes and behaviors.
Dogmatism has been related to resistance to change in several
studies (e.g., Lau and Woodman, 1995). Dogmatic people are
characterized by closed-mindedness and cognitive rigidity. They
are often averse to change because they find it difficult to
adjust to a new situation. Similarly, research on cultural values
(cf., Gudykunst, 1997) suggests that reluctance to change is
related to basic value dimensions, such as uncertainty avoidance
(Hofstede, 1980). Constructs related to cognitive flexibility and
openness are the opposite of closed-mindedness and uncertainty
avoidance. Research on organizational behavior has indicated
that people with high resilience or flexibility are less likely
to experience stress as a result of changes and are therefore
less resistant to organizational change (Wanberg and Banas,
2000).
Other research has focused on the factors that enhance people’s
reluctance to change specific attitudes and beliefs. Reluctance to
change may be greater for attitudes and beliefs that are more
important to one. This not only refers to opinions that are based on
a more careful elaboration of available arguments but also—and
perhaps even more strongly—to beliefs that are tied to one’s self-
view, i.e., self-protection motivation (Johnson and Eagly, 1989;
Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Sherman and Cohen, 2002).
Concerns of Deception
A third motive that might explain why people experience
resistance toward persuasion is concerns of deception. People do
not like to be fooled. People are keen on regarding their belief
system as correct and truthful and are more defensive of their
attitudes when they believe these are correct. The desire to hold
accurate attitudes and opinions is an important motive when
processing information (Petty and Cacioppo, 1979; Chaiken,
1980; Petty et al., 2004). As a result of this desire, people often
scrutinize information by searching for supporting information
and avoiding conflicting information (Lundgren and Prislin,
1998).
Factors Affecting Concerns of Deception
One factor thatmight increase concerns of deception is persuasion
knowledge (Friestad and Wright, 1994). Persuasion knowledge
includes information on tactics that are used in persuasive
situations, how these tactics might influence attitudes and
behavior, which tactics are effective, and the sender’s motives.
When persuasion knowledge is activated, it often elicits suspicion
about the sender’smotives, skepticism towardmessage arguments,
and perceptions ofmanipulative or deceptive intent. Therefore, we
expect a positive relationship between persuasion knowledge and
concerns of deception.
The extent to which people have had negative experiences
with persuasive attempts is also expected to be related to
concerns of deception. Research has indicated that exposure
to deceptive advertising makes people skeptical, even toward
unrelated advertisements from other sources (Darke and Ritchie,
2007). Hence, when people are deceived once, they develop
negative beliefs about communicators in general, undermining
the effectiveness of further persuasive communication (Pollay,
1986). In other words, people who have negative experiences with
persuasive attempts are more likely to experience concerns of
deception, motivating them to resist persuasion.
Skepticism can be described as a tendency to disbelieve.
In a persuasive context, one may be skeptical of the literal
truth of message claims, the motives of the sender, the value
of the information, the appropriateness of the message for a
specific audience (e.g., children) or specific products (e.g., alcohol;
Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1998). A positive relationship
between skepticism and concerns of deception is therefore
expected.
Several message characteristics may trigger concerns of
deception. For example, advertisements that use certain types of
attention-getting tactics, such as delayed sponsor identification,
disclosures, a borrowed interest appeal, or negative or incomplete
comparisons, increase perceptions of the firm’s manipulative
intent, which may result in less favorable brand evaluations (Jain
and Posavac, 2004). Moreover, persuasive attempts that push
people into choices that might benefit the communicator rather
than the recipient may result in the experience of deception
(Koslow, 2000). The suspicion of ulterior motives may affect
information processing and impression formation (e.g., Friestad
and Wright, 1994). When people become aware of ulterior
motives, concerns of deception will increase.
The Strategies and Motives for Resistance
to Persuasion (SMRP) Framework
Having established the motives for resistance, we will discuss
how these motives might be related to the use of the different
types of resistance strategies (i.e., avoidance strategies, contesting
strategies, biased processing strategies, and empowerment
strategies) that were presented in the first section of this paper.We
establish a general preliminary framework predicting the use of
the described resistance strategies by the three different resistance
motives. This framework leads to a set of six propositions that
define plausible relationships between the underlying motives for
resistance and the type of resistance strategy (see Figure 1). Note
that many previous studies in different fields have focused on
resistance motives and resistance strategies. However, to the best
of our knowledge no research empirically tested relationships
between different resistance motives and resistance strategies.
Previous work either focused on one motive resulting in different
resistance strategies or on different motives for one particular
resistance strategy. Moreover, we only found one study that
examined the use of different resistance strategies by focusing
on the likelihood that particular resistance strategies are adopted
in a given persuasive situation (Zuwerink Jacks and Cameron,
2003). Our framework should therefore be regarded as a first
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FIGURE 1 | The SMRP Framework, depicting how resistance motives
and resistance strategies are related.
attempt at organizing the disparate literatures on resistance to
persuasion. By no means we claim that the set of propositions is
exhaustive and that no additional relationships between specific
motivations and specific resistance strategies can be expected.
The aim of the framework is to provide a general overview of how
resistance motivations and resistance strategies might be related
to inspire and guide future research in this domain. In describing
the framework, we first explain the use of avoidance strategies
and then discuss which strategies each resistance motive is likely
to induce. We illustrate these possible relationships by providing
examples from the literature that support our hypothesizing.
Avoidance strategies are different from the other types of
strategies because they re adopted before actual exposure to the
persuasion attempt, as opposed to contesting, biased processing
and empowerment strategies, which are employed during or after
the attempt. We propose that avoidance strategies may occur with
each of the different resistance motives (i.e., threat to freedom,
reluctance to change, and concern of deception). Avoidance
strategies are particularly adopted when people anticipate an
unwanted persuasion attempt, whereas the other strategies are
used to cope with the actual experience of the persuasion attempt,
at which point it is too late to adopt avoidance strategies.
Previous literature provides initial evidence for the idea that
the three defined resistance motives are related to avoidance
strategies. Support for the relationship between reluctance to
change and avoidance strategies can be found for example in
research demonstrating that people who defend a self-expressive
attitude or a core value selectively ignore any information that
may threaten this attitude or value (Chaiken et al., 1996).
More generally, Sweeney et al. (2010) argue that people avoid
information because (inconsistent) information often demands a
change in beliefs or an undesired action. A meta-analysis by Hart
et al. (2009) demonstrated that selective exposure and avoidance is
guided by defense and accuracy motivations. Defense motivation
is defined as the desire to defend one’s existing attitudes, beliefs,
and behavior because one wants to feel validated and remain
consistent beliefs and behaviors (cf. reluctance to change).
Accuracy motivation is related to the motive of concerns of
deception, and defined as the desire to form accurate beliefs
and attitudes. Both accuracy and defense motivations have
been found to initiate selective exposure processes although
these relationships depend on various moderators such as
relevance, information quality, attitude strength, and attitudinal
ambivalence (Sawicki et al., 2013). Research in advertising has
also shown that people who rate advertising as deceptive are more
inclined to avoid the message (Speck and Elliott, 1997).
Other work in the advertising domain (Edwards et al., 2002)
demonstrated that forced exposure to pop-up advertisements
leads to a perceived threat to freedom (operationalized as
advertisement intrusiveness) and subsequently to advertisement
avoidance. In a broader sense, this is reflected in the earlier
cited work by Sweeney et al. (2010), who propose that—next
to reluctance to change—people may be motivated to avoid
inconsistent information because it requires emotion regulation,
which plays an important role in coping with threats to freedom.
In sum, in the literature we found support for our notion that
avoidance strategies are related to the three defined resistance
motives. However, to use the avoidance strategies, people should
be aware of the upcoming persuasive event so that they can avoid
the activation of the resistance motives.
Proposition 1: Avoidance strategies are likely to be adopted upon
the anticipated experience of threats to freedom, unwanted
requests for change, or the possibility of deception.
It is often not possible to avoid a persuasive message,
because such messages are omnipresent in our contemporary
environment. In many situations, avoidance strategies are
therefore not sufficient, so that contesting, biased processing,
and empowerment strategies come into play. We discuss below
how the underlying motives are related to these three types of
strategies. First, we discuss the relationship between reluctance
to change on the one hand, and empowerment and biased
processing strategies on the other. Second, we explain how
concerns of deception predict the use of contesting strategies, and
finally, we describe how threats to freedom are related to both
contesting and empowerment strategies.
Reluctance to Change
We propose that people who are reluctant to change are especially
likely to use empowerment strategies because these strategies
involve resisting persuasive messages by reinforcing either the
self (i.e., assertions of confidence) or the particular attitude
or belief that is challenged (i.e., attitude bolstering, social
validation). Alternatively, they may employ biased processing
strategies because these focus on processing information in such
way that it aligns with existing attitudes and behavior.
The use of empowerment strategies in conditions where people
are reluctant to change is illustrated by several examples. In a
classic study, Sherman and Gorkin (1980) found that attitude
bolstering is more likely to occur when persuasive messages are
targeting on attitudes that are more central to the self. From the
literature on social influence, we know that social validation is
most effective when people feel uncertain about the situation
or their attitudes (Cialdini, 2001). Compton and Pfau (2009)
postulate that people use “talk as reassurance”: when encountering
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threatening information, people talk about this information in
order to reaffirm their current behaviors and beliefs. This idea was
confirmed by Ivanov et al. (2012), who found that the effectiveness
of inoculation messages could be increased by allowing people to
engage in post-inoculation talk in which people can then validate
their attitudes.
Reluctance to change may also induce biased processing
strategies including weighting information and reducing impact
because people are likely to experience dissonance when
confronted with information that is inconsistent with their
beliefs, attitudes, or behavior (Ahluwalia, 2000). Hence, when
trying to maintain the status quo, people are prone to distorting
incoming information such that inconsistent information is
dismissed or devalued, and consist information is valued as more
important. This finding is consistent with research by Innes
(1978) demonstrating that highly dogmatic people, who tend to
be motivated by reluctance to change, used distorted information
processing (e.g., relative weighting and reducing impact) more
often than low dogmatic people.
Proposition 2: When people are reluctant to change, they are
likely to use empowerment and biased processing strategies to
resist persuasion.
Concerns of Deception
When resistance is motivated by concerns of deception, we
argue that contesting strategies will be adopted. These strategies
can be defined as strategies that resist a persuasion attempt
by contesting the content, source, or persuasive strategy of the
message. Individuals who are concerned about deception do not
want to take the risk of being misinformed. They are motivated
to critically process the persuasive message and search for
evidence that the message they receive is untrue, untrustworthy,
or deceptive (Darke and Ritchie, 2007; Main et al., 2007). In
other words, they are more likely to carefully scrutinize the
different elements of the message. Because they are motivated
by concerns of deception, they are afraid of being misinformed,
and tuned toward message cues confirming that the message
cannot be trusted. In the advertising literature, the concept of
advertising skepticism refers to individuals who distrust the
information provided by advertising, and are more likely to
critically process advertisements (Obermiller and Spangenberg,
1998). We argue that any contesting strategy may be used in
such critical processing. Individuals who are concerned about
being misinformed may focus on the inaccuracy of arguments
(i.e., contesting the message), the unreliability of the source (i.e.,
contesting the source), or contest the persuasive strategy that is
used.
The result of this processing is a discounting of the persuasive
message so that people need not question the accuracy of their
existing belief-system. The validity of their beliefs and attitudes
remains intact when the message is rejected, and there is no
need to incorporate the inconsistent information into one’s belief
system when the message can be disregarded and labeled as
untruthful (Darke and Ritchie, 2007). Moreover, when people are
concerned about being fooled, persuasion knowledge (Friestad
and Wright, 1994) is likely to be activated. People will be focused
on the strategies that persuaders use to convince them to change
their behavior. Recognizing these strategies and labeling them as
manipulative and unfair may function as a strategy to resist the
message.
Proposition 3: When concerns of deception are present, people
are likely to use contesting strategies to resist persuasion.
Threats to Freedom
Previous research has revealed that threats to freedom are
inherently related to contesting strategies, particularly contesting
the message (i.e., counter arguing). Contesting a message can
function as a means of restoring freedom. Fukada (1986)
demonstrated that participantswhowerewarned of the persuasive
intent of a message and therefore experienced reactance engaged
in more counter arguing than participants who were not
warned (cf., Dillard and Shen, 2005). Many studies have
observed that people engage in counter arguing when their
freedoms are threatened. Threats to freedom have previously also
been related to source derogation (i.e., contesting the source).
For example, Smith (1977) found that participants who were
exposed to a threatening message exerted source derogation on
three dimensions: objectiveness, expertness, and trustworthiness.
Hence, when exposed to threatening information, people evaluate
the source of the message as someone less expert, as less
objective, and as less trustworthy. Recently, Boerman et al. (2012)
revealed that warning participants of the persuasive intent of
product placement affected conceptual and attitudinal persuasion
knowledge. Being aware of the persuasive intent often arouses
reactance, which affects the activation of persuasion knowledge
about the strategy that is applied.
People who feel that exposure to a persuasivemessage threatens
their freedom are particularly motivated to restore their freedom.
People tend to respond with anger and irritation upon reactance
arousal (Brehm and Brehm, 1981). The motivation to restore
freedom often results in attitudes or behaviors countering those
advocated by themessage.When reactance is induced, peoplemay
overcorrect whereby the original attitudes and behavior are valued
even more than before (Clee and Wicklund, 1980). Therefore, we
argue that restoring threatened freedoms can also be achieved
through empowerment strategies.
Proposition 4: In response to persuasive messages that are
perceived to threaten one’s freedom, people are likely to use both
contesting and empowerment strategies to resist persuasion.
People can feel threatened in their freedom to (a) hold
particular attitudes and behavior, (b) change their attitudes and
behavior, and (c) avoid committing to any position or behavior.
The type of freedom that is threatened is expected to predict
the type of empowerment strategy that people adopt. First,
when people experience a threat to retain a particular attitude
or behavior they are likely to use the empowerment strategies
attitude bolstering and social validation. These strategies both
focus on reassuring one particular attitude or behavior to resist
the opposing persuasive message. For example, when people feel
threatened in their positive attitude toward abortion by exposure
to a message against abortion, they are likely to reinforce their
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existing attitude by thinking about arguments that support their
attitude (i.e., attitude bolstering) or by validating their attitudes
by important others (i.e., social validations). These strategies are
likely to result in even stronger commitment to one’s beliefs, as
suggested by reactance theory, and hence reduce persuasion.
Proposition 5a: In response to persuasive messages that are
perceived as threatening the freedom to hold a particular
attitude or perform a particular behavior, the empowerment
strategies of attitude bolstering and social validation, are more
likely to be used than the empowerment strategy of asserting
confidence.
Second, when resistance is motivated by a more general threat
to the freedom of changing attitudes and behavior or by a threat
to the freedom to avoid committing to any position or behavior,
the empowerment strategy assertions of confidence is more likely
to be used. People’s general self-confidence is enhanced when they
assert the self. Hence, when people feel that a persuasive message
is a threat to their freedom to change attitudes, such as the freedom
to feel, think, and behave how they want, they are less likely to be
inclined to assert the self to enhance self-esteem. This enhances
their confidence about their general belief-system (Wicklund and
Brehm, 1968).
Proposition 5b: In response to persuasive messages that are
perceived as threatening the more general freedom to change
or the freedom to avoid committing to any position or behavior,
the empowerment strategy of asserting confidence is more likely
to be used than other empowerment strategies of resistance.
General Discussion
By building on existing theory and research, this article presents
a preliminary framework explaining why people use certain
resistance strategies. This framework provides an initial step
to a better understanding of resistance processes. Moreover,
this article is the first to present an extensive overview and
classification of strategies that people adopt when motivated to
resist persuasion. In our framework, we argue that the motives
for resistance (i.e., threat to freedom, reluctance to change, and
concerns of deception) predict the type of strategy (i.e., avoidance
strategies, contesting strategies, biased processing strategies, or
empowerment strategies) that people use to resist persuasion.
First, avoidance strategies are proposed to be related to all
the identified resistance motives (e.g., freedom threats, reluctance
to change, and concerns of deception) because these strategies
are assumed to be used upon the anticipated experience of
resistance. Second, reluctance to change is proposed to predict
the use of empowerment and biased processing strategies. Third,
concerns of deception are hypothesized to relate to the adoption
of contesting strategies. Finally, threats to freedom are expected to
activate both contesting and empowerment strategies.
The presented framework has implications for various fields
related to persuasion research, such as health, political, marketing,
and organizational communication. For example, the threat to
freedom motivation is hypothesized to be related to health
messages in particular because people do not prefer others telling
them to quit smoking or exercise more, whereas concerns of
deception seem more related to marketing messages because
people become more skeptical about the trustworthiness of
advertising (Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1998). Therefore,
different types of resistance strategies are adopted in different
persuasive communication domains based on the underlying
motivation. Hence, contesting strategies might be used more
in marketing communications settings whereas both contesting
and empowerment strategies might often be applied in a health
communication setting. More knowledge about the situations in
which people adopt particular types of resistance strategies might
help senders overcome recipients’ resistance.
In addition, it is important to consider the possibility that
individuals may differ in their ability to engage in the resistance
strategies that are defined here. These differences may not only
occur between individuals, but also between strategies within
individuals. An individual may be better in employing strategy
A than strategy B, which may lead to a preference for one
strategy over another. Future research could strive to develop a
complete model of resistance that includes not only resistance
strategies and their motives, but also individual abilities and
situational factors. In addition, such a model could incorporate
more complex patterns of resistance, whereby strategies are
combined sequentially in response to a persuasion attempt. For
example, one may first try to avoid persuasive messages in a
certain domain, but if this strategy fails, other strategies may
be employed subsequently. For example, Chaiken et al. (1996)
find that people ignore threatening information and devote little
resources to it. This strategy, however, is not always feasible, so
that other strategies need to be employed. One candidate strategy
in this particular case may be motivated skepticism (Ditto and
Lopez, 1992; Taber and Lodge, 2006). It seems worthwhile to
explore the possibility that such sequential use of strategies is path-
dependent, with the choice of a strategy at t+ 1 depending on the
strategy that was used at time t.
Future research in this area could use this framework when
investigating resistance. The propositions of the framework about
the links between the underlying resistance motives and the
use of resistance strategies must be empirically tested. Doing
so first requires the development of measures to capture the
different resistance motives. Some useful scales have already been
developed for the threat to freedommotive (e.g., Dillard and Shen,
2005), while others have not yet been operationalized. Second,
there is a need for a scale that measures the relative use of the
defined resistance strategies.
Additional research questions may be derived when combining
the factors that affect the activation of resistance motives and
the different types of resistance strategies. For example, the
framework predicts that highly skeptical people use contesting
strategies to resist persuasion induced by concerns of deception
more frequently, whereas dogmatic people will more frequently
adopt empowerment strategies to resist persuasion induced by
reluctance to change.
The framework also offers a guideline for communication
practitioners who want to persuade people toward behaviors
such as giving up smoking or drinking alcohol, buying a
product, or voting for a particular political candidate. Awareness
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of motives and strategies to resist persuasive messages, may
be used to improve persuasive messages (See Fransen et al.,
2015). For example, when counter arguing is likely to be
adopted, practitioners may create two-sided messages in which
counter arguments are already addressed (Allen, 1991), or
when a threat to freedom is a motive for resistance, disguised
communication strategies in which the persuasive intent is less
obvious, such as brand placement or entertainment-education,
might be helpful in undermining the experience of resistance.
As proposed by Moyer-Gusé (2008), narrative entertainment
might overcome selective avoidance because when people identify
with a character, they might be more willing to consider
inconsistent viewpoints and behaviors as they are experiencing
the story through the eyes of the character. Self-affirmation
is a strategy that may be useful when trying to overcome
defensive processing (i.e., empowerment strategies), which is
often induced by reluctance to change or threats to freedom.
Self-affirmation can be achieved by focusing on other valued
aspects of the self, which are unrelated to the message threat
(Sherman and Cohen, 2002). This strategy allows people to feel a
sense of integrity, which enables them to respond more openly to
counter attitudinal messages and reduce the use of empowerment
strategies.
The literature on resistance to persuasion has spawned many
insights on the variousways inwhich peoplemay resist persuasion
attempts and on how resistance is influenced by other variables.
The present article aims to provide an overarching structure
for this research and advances several propositions for future
research. The framework is rooted in literatures from diverse
disciplines that have examined resistance to persuasion. We hope
it inspires researchers to connect the different areas of resistance
research that have been conducted.
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